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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL 
JUDGES’ ABILITY TO AUTHORIZE ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: A CRY FOR 
CONGRESSIONAL GUIDANCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a drug distribution operation so vast that it takes more than 
forty people to run it.1 This kind of operation is the type Los Dahda (“Mr. 
Dahda”) found himself joining as an importer and a dealer.2 Mr. Dahda had 
several roles in which he helped facilitate the transactions, including “driv-
ing money from Kansas to California for someone in the group to buy the 
marijuana, assisting with the purchase and packaging of marijuana in Cali-
fornia, loading marijuana into crates for shipment to Kansas, and selling the 
marijuana in Kansas to individuals who redistributed the marijuana to oth-
ers.”3 The network operated for nearly seven years and brought approxi-
mately $17 million worth of drugs to Kansas.4 The government began inves-
tigating the drug network in 2011 and obtained wiretap authorization orders 
covering telephones used by the suspected members of the network.5 
After years of surveillance, prosecutors indicted forty-three people, in-
cluding Mr. Dahda, for trafficking in marijuana, cocaine, and methamphet-
amine.6 Prosecutors obtained the majority of the evidence against Mr. Dahda 
through nine wiretap orders issued by the United States District Court for 
the District of Kansas.7 Prior to trial, Mr. Dahda moved to suppress the in-
tercepted communications, arguing that the wiretap orders exceeded the 
district court’s territorial jurisdiction and thus, were facially insufficient.8 
The question presented in Dahda v. United States is whether Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2510–2520 (“Title III”), requires suppression of evidence obtained pursuant 
to a wiretap order that is facially insufficient because the order exceeds the 
 
 1. United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1106 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. 
Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 1105–06. 
 4. Id.; Lawrence Twins convicted in $17 million drug conspiracy that ran through 
barbecue joint, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 24, 2014, 3:54 PM), 
http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/crime/article796203.html. 
 5. Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1106. 
 6. Ian Cummings & Shaun Hittle, Day 1: From the Emerald Triangle to the Sunflower 
State, LAWRENCE JOURNAL WORLD (May 26, 2013, 4:13 PM), http://www2.ljworld.com/
news/2013/may/26/day-1-emerald-triangle-sunflower-state-inside-stor/. 
 7. Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1111. 
 8. Id. 
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judge’s territorial jurisdiction.9 This question has divided the circuit courts 
that have answered it.10 In April 2017, Mr. Dahda and his brother, Roosevelt 
Rico Dahda, filed for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.11 The Supreme Court of the 
United States granted the petition on October 16, 2017.12 
This note argues five points: (1) a cell phone is not a “mobile intercep-
tion device” that falls within the court’s ability to issue a wiretap order be-
cause “mobile interception device” means a mobile device used to intercept 
a telephone call—a cell phone is the thing being intercepted, not the thing 
used to do the intercepting13; (2) courts should not apply the “core concerns” 
reasoning because doing so renders provisions of Title III meaningless14; (3) 
Title III requires suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a wiretap 
order that is facially insufficient because the order exceeds the judge’s terri-
torial jurisdiction15; (4) if the “core concerns” test is applied, courts should 
conclude that territorial jurisdiction limitations implicate a core concern of 
Title III16; and (5) congressional interpretation of Title III’s ambiguous pro-
 
 9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 356, 356 
(2017) (No. 17–43) (In the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the Dahda 
Court had multiple questions before it. One of these questions involved the interpretation of 
the phrase “mobile interception device” as it is used in Title III. Although that particular 
question was not before the Supreme Court of the United States, it is still an important one on 
which the United States circuit courts are split. Further, whether a “mobile interception de-
vice” is used has a direct effect on whether a wiretap order is facially insufficient. Therefore, 
the interpretation of the phrase “mobile interception device” will be discussed in detail 
throughout this note). 
 10. Compare Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1113–14 (holding that the territorial jurisdiction limi-
tation does not implicate a core concern of Title III and, thus, evidence obtained as a result of 
a facially insufficient wiretap order need not be suppressed), with United States v. Glover, 
736 F.3d 509, 514–16 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that the “core concerns” reasoning should 
not be applied to motions to suppress facially insufficient wiretap orders and even if it is 
applied, the territorial jurisdiction limitation implicates a core concern of Title III, and there-
fore, evidence obtained as a result of a facially insufficient wiretap order must be sup-
pressed). 
 11. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 2. 
 12. Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43). On 
May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court, held (1) Title III’s provision requiring suppression if a 
wiretap order is “insufficient on its face” does not contain a “core concerns” requirement, and 
(2) wiretap orders authorizing interception of communications outside the district court’s 
territorial jurisdiction were not “insufficient on their face” within the meaning of the wiretap 
statute’s suppression provision, abrogating Glover, 736 F.3d at 513. Dahda v. United States 
138 S. Ct. 1491, 1492 (2018). 
 13. See infra Part III.A. 
 14. See infra Part III.B. 
 15. See infra Part III.C. 
 16. See infra Part III.C. 
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visions is long overdue, especially considering technological advances that 
have taken place since its enactment.17 
Part II of this note discusses the purposes of Title III, as well as Con-
gress’s motives in enacting the statute, the “territorial jurisdiction” limita-
tion, Title III’s suppression remedy, the current circuit split on the interpre-
tation of the phrase “mobile interception device,” and the current circuit 
split on the application of Title III’s suppression remedy when a wiretap 
authorization order is insufficient on its face.18 Part III argues congressional 
action is long overdue to interpret Title III and settle the issues dividing the 
United States circuit courts.19 Part IV concludes this note.20 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Purpose of Title III is to Regulate Electronic Eavesdropping by 
Government Officials, as Well as Private Actors. 
In 1968, Congress enacted Title III to regulate electronic eavesdrop-
ping by government officials, as well as private actors.21 Title III covers the 
intentional interception by any means of wire, oral, and electronic commu-
nications.22 The statute codified Berger v. New York23 and Katz v. United 
States.24 In particular, Title III addresses the procedural requirements that 
the Supreme Court articulated in Berger.25 
The law at issue in Berger authorized electronic eavesdropping without 
procedural safeguards.26 The Court laid out the following procedural re-
quirements that the New York statute failed to meet: 
(1) Particularity in describing the place to be searched and the person or 
thing to be seized; (2) Particularity in describing the crime that has been, 
is being, or is about to be committed; (3) Particularity in describing the 
type of conversation sought; (4) Limitations on the officer executing the 
 
 17. See infra Part III.D. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 66 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153–
54. 
 22. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231). 
 23. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2194 (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), in 
which the Supreme Court invalidated a New York law which authorized electronic eaves-
dropping without required procedural safeguards, holding that the “basic purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment is to safeguard privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary inva-
sions by government officials”). 
 24. Id. at 2185 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
 25. Berger, 388 U.S. at 58–59. 
 26. Id. at 43. 
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eavesdrop that would (a) prevent his searching unauthorized areas, and 
(b) prevent further searching once the property sought is found; (5) 
Probable cause in seeking to renew the eavesdrop order; (6) Dispatch in 
executing the eavesdrop order; (7) Requiring the executing officer to 
make a return on the eavesdrop order showing what was seized; and (8) 
A showing of exigent circumstances in order to overcome the defect of 
not giving prior notice.
27
 
In Katz, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the standards set out in Berger.28 
Congress used the Court’s decisions in these two cases as a guide when 
drafting Title III.29 
Legislative history indicates that Congress was concerned with “the 
tremendous scientific and technological developments that have taken place 
in the last century [that] have made possible today the widespread use and 
abuse of electronic surveillance techniques.”30 The Senate expressed fear 
that individual privacy was in jeopardy as a result of new and improved sur-
veillance techniques.31 It called for comprehensive, fair, and effective re-
form, emphasizing the need for uniform standards.32 
Congress articulated two main concerns that animate Title III: “(1) pro-
tecting the privacy of wire and oral communications; and (2) delineating on 
a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the intercep-
tion of wire and oral communications may be authorized.”33 Title III protects 
privacy by limiting who is authorized to conduct wiretaps34 and creating an 
evidentiary burden.35 
B. Obtaining a Wiretap Authorization Order 
To obtain a wiretap authorization order, a law enforcement officer must 
file an application with a judge of competent jurisdiction.36 Section 2518(3) 
 
 27. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2161–62 (citing Berger, 388 U.S. at 74). 
 28. Id. at 2162. 
 29. Id. at 2163. 
 30. Id. at 2154. 
 31. Id. (“No longer is it possible, in short, for each man to retreat into his home and be 
left alone. Every spoken word relating to each man’s personal, marital, religious, political, or 
commercial concerns can be intercepted by an unseen auditor and turned against the speaker . 
. . .”). 
 32. Id. at 2156. 
 33. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2153. 
 34. United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1115 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. 
Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43) (citing S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 66) (“only duly 
authorized law enforcement officers engaged in the investigation or prevention of specified 
types of serious crimes”). 
 35. Id. (explaining the evidentiary burden for obtaining a wiretap is probable cause). 
 36. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(9)(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231) (“‘judge of com-
petent jurisdiction’ means (a) a judge of a United States district court or a United States court 
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authorizes a judge to approve a wiretap within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the court in which the judge sits.37 Title III permits courts to authorize law 
enforcement’s interception of telephone communications.38 The term “inter-
cept”39 is broadly defined in Title III and includes the use of a “device”40 to 
acquire the “contents”41 of any telephone call.42 Moreover, interception oc-
curs both where the tapped telephone is located and where law enforcement 
officers put their listening post.43 
Title III comes with limits, however, one of which is the territorial ju-
risdiction limitation.44 Generally, a judge’s authority to authorize law en-
forcement’s interception of telephone communications is limited to his or 
her territorial jurisdiction.45 An exception exists, however, that allows inter-
ception outside the judge’s territorial jurisdiction when a “mobile intercep-
tion device” is used.46 This phrase has been interpreted differently among 
federal courts.47 
C. Title III’s Suppression Remedy 
Under Title III, a suppression remedy exists for communications that 
were intercepted (i) unlawfully; (ii) based on a facially insufficient wiretap 
 
of appeals; and (b) a judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State who is 
authorized by a statute of that State to enter orders authorizing interceptions of wire, oral, or 
electronic communications”). 
 37. § 2518(3). 
 38. §§ 2510–2520. 
 39. § 2510(4) (“‘intercept’ means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any 
wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or 
other device”). 
 40. § 2510(5) (“‘electronic, mechanical, or other device’ means any device or apparatus 
which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication . . . .”). 
 41. § 2510(8) (“‘contents’ when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic com-
munication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication”). 
 42. § 2510(4). 
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1111–12 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. 
granted, 138 S. Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43); United States v. Jackson, 849 
F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 2017); United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Denman, 100 
F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Tamarez, 40 F.3d 1136, 1138 (10th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 44. § 2518(3). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Compare Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1113 (holding that the phrase “mobile interception 
device” can only mean a listening device that is mobile, and thus, a stationary listening de-
vice does not qualify as a mobile interception device for purposes of the statute), with 
Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853 (holding that a mobile interception device does include a stationary 
listening post used to intercept mobile communications). 
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authorization order; or (iii) not in conformity with the wiretap authorization 
order.48 Section 2515 provides that evidence obtained as a result of a viola-
tion of Title III must be suppressed.49 
It is essential to determine the validity of a wiretap order in order to as-
sess whether evidence obtained as a result of a wiretap order should be sup-
pressed.50 Further complicating the matter, the fact that a wiretap order is 
facially insufficient does not mean suppression is required.51 Instead, sup-
pression is required only if a court determines that the jurisdiction require-
ment is one of “those statutory requirements that directly and substantially 
implement[s] the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept[ion] 
procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this 
extraordinary investigative device.”52 This is the question on which the 
United States circuit courts are split, and the one that was addressed by the 
Supreme Court in Dahda v. United States.53 
D. There is a Circuit Split on the Issue of Whether a Stationary Listening 
Post Located Outside a District Court’s Jurisdiction and Used to Inter-
cept Cell Phone Calls is a “Mobile Interception Device” for the Pur-
poses of the Court’s Ability to Issue a Wiretap Order. 
1. The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the phrase “mobile intercep-
tion device” in United States v. Dahda 
The Dahda Court suggested three possible interpretations of the phrase 
“mobile interception device” as provided by Title III: “(1) a listening device 
that is mobile; (2) a cell phone being intercepted; or (3) a device that inter-
cepts mobile communications, such as cell phone calls.”54 The court found 
that only the first of these three possibilities is compatible with the text of 
the statute.55 
 
 48. § 2518(10)(a). 
 49. § 2515 (“[w]henever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part 
of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in 
evidence in any . . . proceeding . . . if the disclosure of that information would be in violation 
of this chapter”). 
 50. § 2518(10)(a). 
 51. Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114 (citing United States v. Foy, 641 F.3d 455, 463 (10th Cir. 
2011) (holding “[n]ot all deficiencies in wiretap applications . . . warrant suppression.”)). 
 52. Id. (citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974)); see United States v. 
Radcliff, 331 F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2003) (extending this rule to suppression for facial 
insufficiency under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii))). 
 53. Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43). 
 54. Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1113. 
 55. Id. 
2019] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 443 
In Dahda, the wiretap ordered the authorized “interception of cell 
phones located outside the issuing court’s territorial jurisdiction.”56 The lis-
tening posts used were also located outside of the court’s territorial jurisdic-
tion.57 Therefore, the orders allowed interception outside the court’s territo-
rial jurisdiction because there was no geographic restriction on the locations 
of either the cell phones or the listening posts.58 As a result, the orders “vio-
lated the general rule that the interception must occur within the issuing 
court’s territorial jurisdiction.”59 
The court had to determine whether the stationary listening post used 
by law enforcement could be considered a “mobile interception device,” as 
the phrase is used in Title III.60 The court reasoned that a statute’s plain lan-
guage controls unless the plain language would “produce a result demon-
strably at odds with the intention of its drafters.”61 The court analyzed what 
“mobile interception device” means by looking at the words’ grammatical 
functions.62 According to the court, the word “‘mobile’ modifies ‘intercep-
tion device,’ and the phrase ‘mobile interception device’ on its face appears 
to refer to the mobility of the device used to intercept communications.”63 
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit concluded that “mobile interception device” 
can mean only a listening device that is mobile; thus, a stationary listening 
device does not constitute a mobile interception device.64 
2. The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the phrase “mobile inter-
ception device” in United States v. Ramirez 
In United States v. Ramirez, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit held that a stationary listening post used to intercept mobile 
communicates constitutes a “mobile interception device” for the purposes of 
Title III.65 In Ramirez, the defendants were convicted of conspiring to dis-
tribute methamphetamine based on evidence obtained from a wiretap of 
their cell phones.66 The government suspected that Paul Hotchkiss (“Hotch-
kiss”), who lived in Wisconsin but dealt drugs in St. Paul, Minnesota, was 
 
 56. Id. at 1112. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1112. 
 61. Id. at 1113 (citing Starzynski v. Sequoia Forest Indus., 72 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 
1995)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. (citing United States v. North, 735 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2013) (DeMoss, J., 
concurring)). 
 64. Id. at 1113–14. 
 65. United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 66. Id. at 851. 
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using a cell phone owned by another defendant, Patrick Flynn (“Flynn”), to 
carry out the conspiracy.67 The government believed that Hotchkiss carried 
the phone with him as he traveled between Minnesota and Wisconsin deal-
ing drugs.68 
Using this information, the government obtained an order authorizing 
the wiretapping of the cell phone line from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Wisconsin.69 The order was issued on April 13, 
1995 and was valid for thirty days.70 The government set up its listening post 
in Minnesota rather than in the Western District of Wisconsin where it ob-
tained the authorization order.71 It located the post in Minnesota out of fear 
that the agents handling the post were at risk for discovery “in the defend-
ants’ home stomping ground.”72 Several days later, agents discovered that 
Hotchkiss was not using the phone.73 The unknown user was talking with 
Flynn about the drug conspiracy the government was investigating and did 
not appear to be traveling outside of Minnesota.74 After the initial thirty days 
expired, the government obtained an extension from the same district judge 
in Wisconsin without disclosing that the cell phone and listening post were 
both located in Minnesota.75 
The case was later reassigned to a different federal judge.76 The de-
fendants filed a motion to suppress based on the argument that the wiretap 
authorization orders were facially invalid because the order authorized wire-
tapping outside of the judge’s territorial jurisdiction.77 The judge denied the 
motion in regards to evidence obtained under the original wiretap, holding 
that the order had been approved based upon the government’s reasonable 
and good faith belief that the phone line was being used in the Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin.78 The judge, however, granted the motion as to evidence 
obtained as a result of the wiretap extension, holding that Title III did not 
permit a judge in one district to authorize wiretapping in another district.79 
The Seventh Circuit adopted the position of the Fifth and Second Cir-
cuits that “an interception takes place both where the phone is located and 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 851. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 851. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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where the scanner used to make the interception is located.”80 The court rea-
soned that a literal interpretation of the statute’s language would make little 
sense and would prevent a judge from authorizing the interception of cell 
phone calls through a stationary listening post when both the cell phone and 
the listening post are located outside of the judge’s district.81 A literal read-
ing of the statute, 
would mean that if as in this case the listening post is stationary and is 
for practical reasons located outside the district in which the crime is be-
ing investigated and the cellular phone is believed to be located, the gov-
ernment, to be sure of being able to tap the phone if it is carried outside 
the district (as is it is quite likely to be, given its mobility), must obtain 
the wiretap order from the district court in which the listening post is lo-
cated, even though that location is entirely fortuitous from the standpoint 
of the criminal investigation.
82
 
According to the Seventh Circuit, “the legislative history of Title III 
suggests that ‘mobile interception device’ was intended to carry a broader 
meaning.”83 The legislative history describes the phrase as applicable “to 
both a listening device installed in a vehicle and to a tap placed on a cellular 
or other telephone instrument installed in a vehicle.”84 The court viewed this 
language as “illustrative rather than definitional because there is no limita-
tion to vehicles in the statute.”85 
The court explained that “a ‘bug’ planted in a car phone is not a ‘mo-
bile interception device’ in an obvious sense; it is a stationary device affixed 
to a stationary object in a moving vehicle.”86 Similarly, a tap is not placed in 
the telephone handset itself but rather is attached to the telephone line at 
some distance from the handset.87 According to the court, the emphasis on 
“mobile interception device” falls on the mobility of what is intercepted 
rather than on the mobility of the device doing the intercepting.88 The court 
further reasoned that the literal interpretation of the statute would compli-
cate law enforcement efforts, while serving no interest in protecting privacy, 
because the government can seek an order from the district court in which 
 
 80. Id. at 852 (citing United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1996); Unit-
ed States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 852–53. 
 84. Id. (explaining that the Seventh Circuit “read this description to be illustrative rather 
than definitional because there is no limitation to vehicles in the statute.”). 
 85. Id. at 852. 
 86. Id. at 852–53. 
 87. Id. at 853. 
 88. Id. 
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the listening post is located authorizing nationwide surveillance of cell 
phone calls.89 
E. There is a Circuit Split on the Issue of Whether Title III Requires Sup-
pression of Evidence Obtained Pursuant to a Wiretap Order That is Fa-
cially Insufficient Because the Order Exceeds the Judge’s Territorial 
Jurisdiction. 
In determining whether suppression is required, some courts have ap-
plied the “core concerns” test of United States v. Chavez.90 This test looks at 
whether the statutory violation implicates a core concern of Title III.91 
1. The Eleventh and Tenth Circuits have held that the territorial ju-
risdiction requirement does not implicate a core concern of Title 
III, and therefore, violations of the territorial jurisdiction re-
quirement do not merit suppression. 
a. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in Adams v. Lankford 
In Adams v. Lankford, the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit found that the core concerns behind the statute were “(1) pro-
tecting the privacy of wire and oral communications; and (2) delineating on 
a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the intercep-
tion of wire and oral communications may be authorized.”92 The court found 
that the legislative history was “silent with respect to the connection, if any, 
between the geographical limitations on state officials’ capacity to authorize 
wiretaps on one hand and the statute’s concern for individual privacy on the 
other.”93 As a result, the court held that a facially insufficient wiretap order 
does not implicate a “core concern” of Congress and therefore suppression 
is not required.94 
 
 89. Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853. 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1114 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. grant-
ed, 138 S. Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43); Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.2d 1493, 
1499 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 91. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575 (1974). 
 92. Adams, 788 F.2d at 1498. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1500. 
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b. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s 
application of the “core concerns” test in United States v. 
Dahda 
Applying the “core concerns” reasoning of Chavez, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that suppression is not required 
for a district court’s authorization of wiretaps beyond a court’s territorial 
jurisdiction because such a statutory violation does not implicate a core con-
cern of Title III.95 The court analyzed the same two underlying concerns of 
Title III that the Eleventh Circuit did in Adams.96 The court determined that 
neither the privacy nor the uniformity concern was implicated because Sec-
tion 2518(3)’s territorial jurisdictional limitation was not mentioned in the 
legislative history of Title III.97 The Tenth Circuit expressly opined that it 
thought suppression might actually undermine the goal of uniformity by 
requiring prosecutors in multiple jurisdictions to coordinate how they use 
electronic surveillance.98 The court rejected Mr. Dahda’s argument that the 
territorial limitation thwarts forum shopping by showing two ways in which 
the statute permits forum shopping.99 
First, the court found that if the government wanted to seek a wiretap 
order from a particular court and neither the target phones nor a listening 
post was located in that court’s territorial jurisdiction, the government could 
forum shop by using a mobile interception device.100 Second, the court 
found that the government could forum shop by putting its listening post in 
its preferred judge’s district.101 Because the statute does not restrict where 
law enforcement can put its listening post, it can choose where it wants to 
put it.102 As a result, the court concluded that suppression was not required 
for district court’s authorization of wiretaps beyond the court’s territorial 
jurisdiction.103 
 
 95. Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1115–16. 
 96. Id. at 1114–15. 
 97. Id. at 1115–16. 
 98. Id. at 1115 (citing Adams, 788 F.2d at 1499). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-281)). 
 101. Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1115. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1114. 
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2. The Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits have held that the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction requirement does implicate a core concern of 
Title III, and therefore, evidence obtained in violation of the terri-
torial jurisdiction requirement must be suppressed. 
a. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision and subsequent “non-decision” in United States v. 
North 
In United States v. North, a judge in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Mississippi issued a wiretap order for a cell phone 
based in Texas.104 The government believed the defendant was using the 
phone to conduct his business of delivering drugs to Mississippi.105 While 
the phone was based in Texas, the government’s listening post was located 
in Louisiana.106 Initially, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not 
have territorial jurisdiction to issue the wiretap.107 The court found that the 
territorial jurisdiction limitation was a “core concern” of Congress, and 
therefore, evidence from the wiretap must be suppressed.108 Two months 
later, however, the court withdrew its initial decision and issued a second 
opinion that did not reach the territorial jurisdiction issue but, instead, sup-
pressed the evidence based on minimization issues.109 
In its first decision, the Fifth Circuit addressed the territorial jurisdic-
tion question, holding that “except in the case of a mobile interception de-
vice, a district court cannot authorize interception of cell phone calls when 
neither the phone nor the listening post is present within the court’s territori-
al jurisdiction.”110 The court held that the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Mississippi lacked the authority to permit the intercep-
tion of cell phone calls from Texas at a listening post located in Louisiana.111 
The court addressed whether the lack of territorial jurisdiction requires 
suppression of evidence obtained from a wiretap issued without jurisdiction-
al authority, holding that 
 
 104. United States v. North, 735 F.3d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. United States v. North (North I), No. 11-60763, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 2013), su-
perseded by North, 735 F.3d 212. 
 108. Id. 
 109. North, 735 F.3d at 215–17 (The court suppressed the evidence based on minimiza-
tion issues and therefore did not reach North’s other arguments. Title III requires the gov-
ernment to take objectively reasonable measures in an effort to minimize the interception of 
non-pertinent conversations). 
 110. North I, No. 11-60763, at *5. 
 111. Id. 
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Title III’s territorial restrictions prevent forum manipulation by law en-
forcement, and prevent wiretap authorizations in cases where investiga-
tors would otherwise be able to obtain them. Limiting the number of dis-
trict judges authorized to issue a wiretap warrant reduces the opportunity 
for the government to use forum manipulation to obtain a warrant that 
may not be approved elsewhere.
112
 
The court opined that the territorial jurisdiction requirement implicates a 
core concern of Title III – privacy.113 “Territorial limitations on a district 
court directly implicate Congress’s intent to guard against the unwarranted 
use of wiretapping.”114 
Fewer than two months after its first decision in North, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, sua sponte, withdrew its first opinion and issued a new one.115 The 
court did not decide the issue of territorial jurisdiction and ruled only on the 
issue of minimization.116 These conflicting decisions by the Fifth Circuit 
have further complicated the debate of whether there are jurisdictional limi-
tations on the authority of federal judges to issue wiretaps under Title III. 
b. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit’s decision regarding jurisdictional limitations 
in United States v. Glover 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtained a wiretap order 
from a district judge in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit.117 The government wanted to place an audio recording 
device on the defendant’s truck.118 The truck was parked outside the district 
court’s jurisdiction, and therefore, the government sought a wiretap order 
that would allow it to enter the truck regardless of its location.119 
The court concluded that the order violated Title III on its face because 
it authorized placing an interception device on property that was not within 
the district court’s jurisdiction at the time of the order.120 In determining the 
proper remedy for the violation, the court held that the “core concerns” test 
does not apply to motions to suppress facially insufficient Title III wiretap 
orders, and even if the “core concerns” test did apply, the territorial jurisdic-
 
 112. Id. at 9. 
 113. Id. at 20. “We fail to see how this is not a significant protection of privacy.” Id. at 9. 
 114. Id. at 9. 
 115. United States v. North, 735 F.3d 212, 213 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting “Opinion, 728 
F.3d 429, withdrawn and superseded”). 
 116. Id. at 212–16. 
 117. United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 510 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 514–15. 
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tion limitation implicates a core concern of Title III.121 Thus, the court held 
that “suppression is the mandatory remedy when evidence is obtained pur-
suant to a facially insufficient warrant.”122 
The court further pointed out that to the extent that the statute is am-
biguous, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs, and it 
is unambiguous.123 According to the court, Rule 41 partially implements the 
statute and states that “a magistrate judge with authority in the district has 
authority to issue a warrant for a person or property outside the district if the 
person or property is located within the district when the warrant is issued 
but might move or be moved outside the district before the warrant is exe-
cuted.”124 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. A Cell Phone is Not a “Mobile Interception Device” That Falls Within 
a Court’s Ability to Issue a Wiretap Order. 
A cell phone being intercepted cannot be a “mobile interception de-
vice,” unless a cell phone can intercept itself. In other words, as the Dahda 
court pointed out, a cell phone “is the thing being intercepted, not the thing 
being used to intercept.”125 Therefore, a particular cell phone cannot be in-
tercepted while also being the device used to carry out the interception.126 
Moreover, the plain language of Title III indicates that a device is 
something used to intercept a call.127 Therefore, a “mobile interception de-
vice” must be something other than a cell phone that is being intercepted.128 
A mobile interception device must be a mobile device that intercepts com-
munications.129 The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Ramirez, that the phrase 
“mobile interception device” includes a cell phone being intercepted, is in-
compatible with the statute in that it ignores the statute’s unambiguous lan-
guage providing that a device is something that is used to intercept a call.130 
This interpretation simply does not make sense when one considers the defi-
nition of the word “device” under the statute.131 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 514. 
 123. Glover, 736 F.3d at 515. 
 124. Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(2)). 
 125. United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1113 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. 
Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43). 
 126. Id. at 1113. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1114. 
 129. Id. at 1113–14. 
 130. United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 549, 852 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 131. Id. 
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In addition, when Congress enacted Title III, cell phones did not ex-
ist.132 Therefore, it is clear that Congress would not have interpreted the 
phrase “mobile interception device” to include a cell phone.133 Given this 
fact and the statute’s plain language, it seems likely that Congress intended 
“mobile interception device” to mean a listening device that is mobile and 
not a cell phone. 
B. Courts Should Not Apply the “Core Concerns” Reasoning Because 
Doing So Renders Section 2518(10)(a)(i) Meaningless. 
Title III’s suppression remedy provides: 
[A]ny aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before 
any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authori-
ty of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may 
move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral communication inter-
cepted pursuant to this chapter, or evidence derived therefrom, on the 
grounds that 
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted 
is insufficient on its face; or 
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of au-
thorization or approval.
134 
Thus, there are three situations in which a person has a right to move to sup-
press the contents of any wire or oral communication.135 In United States v. 
Chavez and United States v. Giordano, the Supreme Court of the United 
States considered Title III’s suppression remedy in the context of Section 
2518(10)(a)(i), which provides for suppression as result of an “unlawful[] 
intercept[tion].”136 The Court made clear that not every violation of Title 
III’s requirements results in an “unlawful interception” under Section 
 
 132. 5 major moments in cellphone history, CBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2013, 5:33 AM), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/5-major-moments-in-cellphone-history-1.1407352 (stat-
ing that on April 3, 1973, Motorola engineer Martin Cooper made the world’s first public call 
from a mobile phone). 
 133. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation and Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal 
Def. Lawyers in Support of Petitioners at 11, Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1491 (2018) 
(No. 17-43). 
 134. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(10)(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231). 
 135. Id. 
 136. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575 (1974); United States v. Giordano, 416 
U.S. 505, 525–26 (1974); § 2518(10)(a)(i). 
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2518(10)(a)(i).137 The Court held that suppression for an “unlawful[] inter-
cept[tion]” is only required for a “failure to satisfy any of those statutory 
requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional 
intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly 
calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device.”138 
In United States v. Radcliff, the Tenth Circuit extended the “core con-
cerns” test of Giordano and Chavez to motions to suppress under Section 
2518(10)(a)(ii).139 Section 2518(10)(a)(ii) provides for suppression when a 
wiretap authorization order is insufficient on its face.140 On the contrary, the 
District of Columbia Circuit noted in Glover that the “core concerns” test 
articulated in Chavez and Giordano should not be extended to facially insuf-
ficient wiretap orders under Section 2518(10)(a)(ii). 141 
Section 2518(10)(a)(i) applies to unlawful interceptions, while (ii) ap-
plies to a wiretap authorization order that is insufficient on its face.142 As 
noted in Glover, however, these two appear to overlap because “if an au-
thorization order is ‘insufficient on its face,’ the communication would nec-
essarily be ‘unlawfully intercepted.’”143 Therefore, a broad reading of para-
graph (i) would render the other two provisions of Section 2518(10)(a) su-
perfluous.144 
The “core concerns” test is a restriction on paragraph (i)’s unlawfully 
intercepted language and was developed by the Supreme Court in order to 
give meaning to the other paragraphs of Section 2518(10).145 When a court 
applies the “core concerns” reasoning to Section 2518(10)(a)(ii), it essential-
ly eliminates Title III’s suppression remedy for facially insufficient wiretap 
orders because “anything that gives rise to suppression under paragraph (ii) 
necessarily also does so under paragraph (i).”146 In other words, if you apply 
the “core concerns” test to both the unlawfully intercepted and facially in-
sufficient provisions of Section 2518(10)(a), they become one in the same, 
and, therefore, Section 2518(10)(a)(ii) becomes “drained of meaning.”147 
This is exactly what the Supreme Court was trying to avoid in Chavez and 
 
 137. Chavez, 416 U.S. at 575; Giordano, 416 U.S. at 526. 
 138. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527. 
 139. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 8–9 (citing United States v. Radcliff, 
331 F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2003)). 
 140. § 2518(10)(a)(ii). 
 141. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 13 (citing United States v. Glover, 
736 F.3d 509, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (quoting United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575 (1974)) (“a broad reading of 
paragraph (i) would render (ii) and (iii) redundant and ‘drained of meaning.’”). 
 145. Id. at 19 (citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 525–26 (1974)). 
 146. Id. at 20 (citing Glover, 736 F.3d at 513). 
 147. Glover, 736 F.3d at 513 (quoting Chavez, 416 U.S. at 575). 
2019] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 453 
Giordano.148 The Court intended for the “core concerns” test to apply only 
to paragraph (i), not (ii).149 
Paragraph (i)’s provision that “an aggrieved person may move to sup-
press the contents . . . on the grounds that the communication was unlawful-
ly intercepted” requires a general and broad analysis of the government’s 
interception procedures to determine whether its actions infringed upon the 
“core concerns” of the statute.150 Paragraph (ii) regarding suppression where 
a wiretap authorization order is facially insufficient, on the other hand, re-
quires a mechanical test.151 “The warrant is either facially sufficient or it is 
not.”152 Title III does not provide for judicial discretion on this point because 
the statute is clear.153 Evidence obtained as a result of a facially insufficient 
wiretap authorization order must be suppressed.154 There is simply no need 
for additional analysis when the statute is unambiguous.155 
The wiretap authorizing law enforcement to conduct a wiretap of Mr. 
Dahda’s phone line was facially insufficient because it authorized wiretap-
ping outside the issuing court’s territorial jurisdiction without regard to 
whether a “mobile interception device” would be used.156 The facial insuffi-
ciency of the wiretap order does not require examination of Congress’s 
“core concerns” in enacting Title III but rather requires the application of 
the mechanical test of Section 2518(10)(a)(ii).157 
Applying the mechanical test of Section 2518(10)(a)(ii), the evidence 
used to convict Mr. Dahda should have been suppressed as a violation of 
Title III.158 A court’s failure to apply the mechanical test required by Section 
2518(10)(a)(ii) results in the conviction of criminal defendants whose priva-
cy rights were violated by the government’s failure to abide by the clear 
requirements of Title III.159 
 
 148. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 20. 
 149. Id. at 13 (citing Glover, 736 F.3d at 515). 
 150. Glover, 736 F.3d at 513. 
 151. Id. 
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C. Congress Enacted an Unambiguous and Mandatory Suppression Rem-
edy to Minimize Unlawful Surveillance That Courts Should be Bound 
to Apply. 
If the “core concerns test” is applied, courts must recognize that the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction limitation implicates a core concern of Title III.160 Con-
gress’s underlying reasons for enacting Title III—privacy and uniformity—
were implicated by Mr. Dahda’s argument that the wiretap order exceeded 
the Kansas district court’s jurisdiction. 
Title III contains a “statutorily mandated suppression remedy for viola-
tions of its requirements”.161 The statute provides, in relevant part, 
“[w]henever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part 
of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom 
may be received in evidence in any trial . . . if the disclosure of that infor-
mation would be in violation of this chapter.”162 
The Senate noted that the provisions for suppression and exclusion in 
Title III are integral to the privacy regime established by the statute.163 Title 
III’s suppression requirement is unambiguous.164 Nonetheless, courts have 
simply decreed that facially insufficient wiretap orders, like the one in Mr. 
Dahda’s case, do not merit suppression, without providing support for their 
analyses.165 
Congress enacted Title III to protect privacy and to advance the goal of 
uniformity.166 It is not the judiciary’s role to decide on a case-by-case basis 
whether it wants to implement the mandated suppression remedy provided 
by statute. When courts do so, they undermine one of Congress’s main goals 
in enacting Title III, uniformity, by creating incongruous results among fed-
 
 160. Glover, 736 F.3d at 514–15. 
 161. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 5. 
 162. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2515 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231). 
 163. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 96 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2185. 
 164. § 2515 (stating “[w]henever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, 
no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be 
received in evidence in any . . . proceeding . . . if the disclosure of that information would be 
in violation of this chapter”). 
 165. See, e.g. United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1114 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. grant-
ed, 138 S. Ct. 356, 356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-43); Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.3d 1493, 
1499–1500 (11th Cir. 1986) (the territorial jurisdiction requirement does not implicate a core 
concern of Title III, and therefore, violations of the territorial jurisdiction requirement do not 
merit suppression). 
 166. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2156. 
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eral courts.167 These different interpretations result in unfair adjudication for 
criminal defendants.168 
Furthermore, Title III’s territorial jurisdiction limitation limits the gov-
ernment’s opportunity to engage in forum shopping.169 Without the territori-
al jurisdiction limitation, law enforcement would be able to get a warrant in 
a jurisdiction where it may not be approved elsewhere.170 Although the leg-
islative history may not specifically mention forum shopping, it does men-
tion privacy.171 Forum shopping would allow law enforcement to obtain a 
wiretap authorization order from the judge of its choosing, making these 
orders easier to obtain, and therefore, posing a threat to individual priva-
cy.172 
D. Congress Should Update the Privacy Protections Under Title III to 
Deal with the Increasing Threat to Privacy Posed by Advances in Wire-
tapping Technology 
Congress and the federal judiciary have long recognized that wiretap-
ping poses a serious threat to privacy, and today, that threat is even more 
alarming.173 Wiretaps are arguably more intrusive than a physical search 
warrant because they allow law enforcement to obtain the subject’s words, 
as well as any communication between the subject and third parties.174 
When Congress enacted Title III, it intended to permit wiretaps, but on-
ly under the “narrowest of circumstances.”175 The privacy concerns that an-
imate Title III have become more pervasive with the proliferation of tech-
nology since 1968.176 Moreover, when Congress enacted Title III in the late 
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1960s, it had no idea that wiretapping technology would be where it is to-
day.177 Cell phones did not exist when Congress enacted Title III, and there-
fore, Congress never could have contemplated the ubiquitous nature of 
smart phone technology.178 
As wiretapping technology has evolved, it has become easier for the 
government to obtain them.179 A physical intrusion is no longer necessary to 
conduct a wiretap.180 In 2018, government agents have the ability to listen to 
voice conversations, read texts, and view data communication, pictures, and 
emails sent from anywhere.181 Cell phones contain a plethora of information 
regarding “nearly every aspect of our lives . . . from the mundane to the in-
timate.”182 
What is perhaps even more alarming is that an agent can do all of these 
things from the comfort of his or her office.183 Since the enactment of Title 
III, the number of wiretaps has increased dramatically, with over forty-three 
million conversations intercepted last year.184 Interestingly, on average, only 
about twenty percent of intercepted conversations are criminal in nature.185 
In 2016, the most interceptions occurred in the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.186 The district authorized the wire-
tap of 3,292,385 cell phone conversations or messages over a period of sixty 
days.187 More frightening than this is the fact that out of the over three mil-
lion conversations intercepted in one federal district in just sixty days, none 
of the conversations were incriminating.188 
Rapid advances in technology have resulted in nearly fifty years of 
ambiguity regarding the interpretation and application of Title III. Thus, if 
Congress was concerned about the privacy intrusion of wiretaps in the late 
1960s, it should really be concerned about the privacy implications of wire-
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taps in 2018.189 After nearly half a century of ambiguity regarding phrases 
used in Title III, such as “interception” and “mobile interception device,” 
congressional action is overdue. Moreover, Congress needs to clarify the 
correct application of Title III’s suppression remedy in cases involving wire-
tap authorization orders that exceed the issuing judge’s territorial jurisdic-
tion. Title III is “in need of congressional attention” to address “[a]dvances 
in wiretapping technology.”190 Despite the widespread use of technology, 
American citizens must maintain the right to be free from unwarranted in-
trusions by the government. 
Some of the terms and phrases of Title III are ambiguous and the sup-
pression requirement provided for in Section 2518(10)(a)(ii) has not been 
followed by all courts.191 This has resulted in incongruous results among the 
United States circuit courts.192 This is unfair to criminal defendants, due to 
the fact that the application of Title III’s suppression remedy often turns on 
which court is hearing the defendant’s case.193 The suppression of evidence 
based upon a facially insufficient wiretap order should not turn on which 
court hears the case. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A cell phone is not a “mobile interception device” that falls within the 
court’s ability to issue a wiretap order because a “mobile interception de-
vice” means a mobile device used to intercept a call—a cell phone is the 
thing being intercepted, not the thing used to do the intercepting.194 Further-
more, Title III requires suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a wire-
tap order that is facially insufficient because the order exceeds the judge’s 
territorial jurisdiction.195 
The “core concerns” test announced in United States v. Chavez should 
not be applied in situations like Mr. Dahda’s, and if the “core concerns” test 
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is applied, a facially insufficient wiretap order that exceeds the judge’s terri-
torial jurisdiction implicates one of Title III’s core concerns.196 
Regardless of the arguments that can be made by scholars, attorneys, 
and courts, after fifty years of ambiguity regarding the language in Title III 
and the intentions of Congress in enacting it, congressional action is long 
overdue. It is essential that Congress clarify Title III and clarify how courts 
should deal with facially insufficient wiretap orders. The widespread use of 
wiretapping technology merits Congress’s time and efforts. Federal courts 
need unambiguous guidance regarding the suppression of evidence obtained 
on the basis of facially insufficient wiretap orders in order to implement the 
law in a uniform and fair manner. 
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